How to Lose a War at Sea by Bill Fawcett

Author:Bill Fawcett
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: HarperCollins
Published: 2013-10-01T00:00:00+00:00

Orders

On July 4 the American ships in the convoy all ran up brand-new oversize flags, in honor of Independence Day; the sight cheered their crews and impressed the British who observed the gesture from their own ships. Later that day, however, the Naval War Staff met in London and arrived at what would prove to be a catastrophic decision, authorized by First Sea Lord Pound, with the full agreement of every member of his staff. Fearing that the German surface ships would strike at any moment, the staff on dry land, far from the action, sent three orders between 9:11 and 9:30 P.M., orders that shocked and appalled Admiral Hamilton and Commander Broome.

All of the orders were prefaced with a “Most Immediate” tag, meaning that they were high priority. The first commanded “Cruiser force to withdraw to the west at high speed.” Twelve minutes later came an alarm about the threat from surface ships, with instructions to disperse the convoy, with each ship heading for a Russian port on its own, without benefit of convoy or escort. Shortly thereafter, the unambiguous command “Convoy is to scatter” came over the airways.

This short flurry of communications allowed the German surface fleet to inflict more damage on the Allies than at any other period during the war—and all without firing a shot or even appearing on the horizon! For, unknown to the Admiralty, the mighty ships had already been recalled. Fearing interference from an Allied aircraft carrier, Hitler declined to risk Tirpitz in battle. Even more ignominiously, Scheer had run aground right off Narvik and was incapable of operating against the convoy.

In the convoy escorts, both Hamilton and Broome were taken aback. They had been brimming with confidence, having beaten off the air attacks with minimal damage, and had yet to suffer a torpedo attack from the U-boats known to be in the vicinity. With Broome’s tight screen of destroyers and other anti-submarine vessels, the officers on the scene felt that they had a very good chance of pushing through all the way to Archangel. In the words of one officer aboard an escorting warship, “By simply shifting her anchorage the Tirpitz had done what massed U-boats and aircraft failed to do: she had broken the cohesion of the convoy.”

The results of the plan were clear to everyone aboard the warships and merchantmen alike: without the tight formation of the convoy, and the presence of the escorts, the cargo ships would be helpless against the obvious threats of German aircraft and U-boats. Emotions verged on rage among the crews and captains of the warships as they were confronted with the confounding change, but they had no choice but to obey the order. As an officer aboard the heavy cruiser Norfolk recorded later: “The effect on the ship’s company was devastating. . . . We abandoned the convoy. The ship was in a turmoil, everyone was boiling, and the Master at Arms told me he had never known such strong feelings before. . . .

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